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The Production of Legitimacy in New Zealand Local Government Auditing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper expands our understanding of the introduction of new audit arrangements in the 
public sector by looking at three cases relating to the audit of local government. The first case 
saw the Audit Office replacing the elected auditors as the sole auditor of municipalities in 
1886; the second case saw the Auditor-General fail to gain additional powers to control the 
financial management of local government; and the third case saw the introduction of 
operational audits in New Zealand local government. Following Power (2003, p.391), the 
paper illustrates how legitimacy was sought in these three cases by using the three stages of 
controversy, closure and credibility. All three stages can be separately identified in the two 
cases that succeed, with the failure point for the unsuccessful case being identified as the 
controversy stage. The use of Power (2003) is viewed as useful in accounting history and it 
avoids the use of terms associated with auditing, such as independence and objectivity, being 
used to evaluate auditing practice and arrangements.  
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The Production of Legitimacy in Public Sector Auditing Policies – The Case of New 
Zealand Municipalities 1882-1980 
 
1 Introduction 
Accounting and auditing are in constant change. This paper expands our understanding of the 
introduction of new audit arrangements in the public sector by looking at three cases relating to 
the audit of local government. Following Power (2003, p.391), the paper illustrates how 
legitimacy was sought in these three cases by using the three stages of controversy, closure and 
credibility. Audit practices gaining legitimacy and the institutional arrangements for auditing 
including the choice of auditor gaining legitimacy are closely related issues (Power, 2003, 
p.390). This paper outlines how a proposal for the Audit Office, a central government 
department, to become the sole auditor of New Zealand municipalities in 1882 obtained 
legitimacy, how a proposal for an increase in the scope of the Audit Office oversight of local 
government finance failed ten years later, and thirdly how, beginning in the early 1970s, the 
introduction of operational audits for local government took 15 years to fully gain legitimacy. 
How auditing practices and arrangements gain legitimacy in the New Zealand local 
government context is all the more interesting as local government relies on central 
government for its mandate and authority, while at the same time local government fiercely 
guards its independence from central government interference. 
Two of the cases saw the successful implementation of new requirements for local government 
auditing. These two cases are significant because they represent the two major changes to the 
auditing practices between the start of municipal corporations in New Zealand circa 1867 and 
the late 1980s. Other than these changes there were no significant changes to the auditing of 
New Zealand municipalities. The minor changes that did occur were the gradual changes in 
auditing technology such as the introduction of sampling as reflected in both public and private 
sector practice. The significance of the third case is twofold; firstly it failed to gain legitimacy 
and thus failed to be introduced, something relatively infrequently found in the accounting 
history literature and secondly had it been successful it would have been a significant change to 
local government audit and control requirements.  
While Power (2003) has been widely cited in the accounting and auditing literature (for 
example Skærbæk, 2009; Gendron, et al 2007) the usefulness of the schema has not been 
evaluated in the accounting history literature. History can provide useful sites to evaluate 
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theoretical models, particularizing in a time and place that which has been generalized (Burke, 
1993, p.23). This paper also contributes to our understanding of the conflicts around local 
government auditing from time periods before the audit explosion and in the public sector 
before new public management (Power, 1997). 
The paper relies on archival and primary sources from the central government archives and 
parliamentary library. It uses records from the parliamentary processes including parliamentary 
debates records, parliamentary committee records and submissions to analyse the first two 
cases. For the third case files from the Controller and Auditor-General are the predominant 
primary source used.  
The paper is structured as follows; the next section reviews the existing literature on the 
historical development of public sector auditing arrangements. Section three outlines Power’s 
(2003) schema that will be used to interpret the three cases, and section four provides 
background on New Zealand local government and its political and constitutional 
arrangements. Section five analyses the three cases using Power’s (2003) explanatory schema. 
The paper concludes by way of discussion and conclusion. 
2 Existing literature  
The literature on the history of public sector auditing can be divided into three types; histories 
of specific institutions or personalities, studies that focus on the origin and/or evolution of 
aspects of public sector auditing, and studies that focus on conflict regarding jurisdiction, scope 
or performance of audits. The majority of public sector studies are located at federal, national 
or provincial level, with very few studies dealing specifically with local government or parts 
thereof. Underlying most studies is an acknowledgement of the contested nature of auditing 
practices and institutional arrangements, with each type of study addressing the contested 
nature of audit in different ways. 
Institutional histories and studies of important individuals share significant similarities with the 
other two categories; however their arrangement is often chronological and/or structured 
around the ‘man at the top’ at the time. Often these histories are of a more public history form 
than academic history, for example see Green & Singleton (2009), Trask (2001), Wanna, Ryan 
and Ng (2001) and Yule (2002). These histories often placed all aspects of the contested nature 
of the auditing practices and arrangements including the institution’s origins, institutional 
arrangements, and internal and external conflicts in the context of the overall development or 
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evolution of the institution, treating the contested nature of audit as part of the fabric that 
makes up the organisation. 
Studies from within the academy on institutions and important individuals often focus on the 
legacy of a particular person. For example Morecroft et al (2000) look specifically at the 
contribution to US government accounting and in particular the work on operational auditing 
of T Coleman Andrews. The study links the man, his era and his career to contemporary 
developments in US government accounting. Wanna and Ryan (2003) illustrate that the 
problems in subsequent periods of the Australian Audit Office can be seen in the legacy of the 
first Auditor-General. Funnell (1996) focuses on the resistance of one man, Lord Monteagle, to 
changes that would have strengthen the relationship between the British parliament and the 
state auditor. Recommendations made by a parliamentary select committee took ten years to be 
enacted because of influence of Monteagle in favour of the status quo. The paper highlights the 
importance of individuals and the power of elites, such as the Treasury, in the development of 
auditing practices in the public sector.  
Studies focused on the origin or evolution of audit practice and institutional arrangements tend 
to either ignore the contested nature of auditing or view the outcome of the ‘contest” as a win 
over lesser options or poorer arguments. McSweeney and Sherer (1990) and Flesher and 
Zarzeski (2002) review the origins of operational auditsi. McSweeney and Sherer (1990) focus 
on the origin of operational audits in the UK local government. Their study outlines that the 
development of the audits was based on an uncritical acceptance of the rationality of the audits 
and the causal relationship in local government performance measures; both assumptions 
which the paper critiques. Flesher and Zarzeski (2002) illustrates how the development of 
operational audits in the English speaking world occurred both simultaneously and 
independently in the US and Canada. According to Flesher and Zarzeski (2002) the technology 
subsequently transferred from Canada to other British Commonwealth countries. The study 
focuses on the leadership of a range of institutions and key people, including T Coleman 
Andrews and relies on official and profession literature.  
Funnell (1994, 1997) outlines constitutional and parliamentary historical reasons for the 
development of the British government auditor. Funnell (1997) outlines the military influences 
on the development of public sector auditing. Focusing on the years between 1830 and 1880, 
                                                 
i Various terms have been used for non-financial audits including, performance audits, value for money, efficiency 
audits and operational audits; in this paper for simplicity sake I will use the later unless context demands 
otherwise. 
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Funnell argues that the audit arrangement of the military resulted from the Parliament’s desire 
for greater control over the military through control of the military’s spending, thus the military 
were subjected to more controls than other parts of the public sector. As the parliament sought 
greater control over all government departments the military’s requirements were used as the 
template for such controls. Funnell (1994) discusses how the Treasury as an organ of the 
government maintained the limited independence of the state auditor despite moves by the 
parliament to strengthen the independence of the auditor and provide a closer relationship 
between the parliament and the state auditor. The paper highlights the role of the Treasury in 
the battle for an independent auditor between the parliament and the government.  
Coombs and Edwards’ (1990) history of the evolution of the UK district auditor focuses on the 
theme of the central government seeking an increase in the control it has over the activities of 
local government. This desire by central government to increase its control over local 
government seen as originating “many centuries ago” (p. 153). Audit and the district auditor 
were seen as an important part of this control over local government expenditure (p. 173).  
The third group of studies illustrate conflicts in auditing and audit practice. These papers are 
the most explicit about the contested nature of auditing practices and institutional arrangements. 
The most frequently studied area is again operational audits. The Australian experience of 
operational audits has been subjected to significant review and in particular various 
interpretations of what the audit (should) consist of and how they should be undertaken 
(Hamburger, 1989; Guthrie and Parker, 1999). Similar studies of less historical nature include 
Sutherland (1980) and Radcliffe (1997; 1998) on aspects of the Canadian experience. Other 
studies have also focused on contested nature of public sector auditing, beyond operational 
audits. Coombs and Edwards (2004) discuss a power struggle over a hundred year period from 
1835 for the right to undertake municipal audits between the elected audits, the district audits 
and the emerging accounting profession. Over that period there was a shift from the dominance 
of elected auditors to the district audits and a latter increase in the use of the accounting 
profession. Both Funnell (1998) and English and Guthrie (2000) focus on the conflict between 
the executive and its agencies and the auditor for control of the scope and applicability of the 
work of the Australian Auditor-General. Jacobs (1998) reviews a similar situation in the New 
Zealand context of competing for control of operational audits between Treasury and the 
Auditor-General. 
The contested nature of auditing practices and institutional arrangements is found, either 
explicitly or implicitly, in most studies of public sector auditing arrangements and practices. 
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The majority of studies; be they focus on the importance or contribution of individuals or 
institutions, or debates over origins, practices or institutional arrangements; address the 
question of success in the adoption of proposed auditing practices and/or auditing 
arrangements in terms of out manoeuvring opposition or being a better option than alternatives. 
Papers will often refer to debates and successful proposals in terms such as the “relative merits” 
of alternative arrangements (Coombs and Edwards, 2004 p81), will chronological debates over 
alternatives as played out in public (see for example Coombs and Edwards, 1990; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1999) or use appeals to key concepts in auditing such as independence (Funnell, 1994). 
In contrast this study uses Power’s (2003) explanatory schema to further our understanding of 
the contested nature of public sector auditing. The schema does not rely on using references to 
the profession or auditing itself, rather uses concepts established outside auditing. The next 
section reviews Power’s (2003) schema.  
3 Power (2003) - Producing Legitimacy  
Power’s (2003) essay explores four themes in contextualist and critical audit research, focusing 
on the production of legitimacy. Legitimacy is required at both the level of the individual 
practitioner and field of practice, with the legitimacy of the auditor and the legitimacy of an 
audit practice considered co-produced. The introduction of auditing into new areas is the fourth 
theme that Power discusses, and is the focus of this study. Following Radcliffe (1999), Power 
suggests that when audit receives a new mandate it allows for professional reinvention and a 
“new legitimacy in the management hierarchy of control agents” (Power, 2003 p.387). Part of 
the process involves the acceptance of the knowledge basis of the auditor qua institution, prior 
to the acceptance of the individual auditor’s knowledge basis and legitimacy. Once the auditing 
practice has been legitimatized the individual auditor can go about their work as legitimate. 
Drawing on existing studies and based on categories currently in use in the science studies 
literature (controversy, closure and credibility) Power (2003, 391) provides an explanatory 
schema for addressing the acceptance and/or rejection of proposed auditing practices and 
arrangements. Controversy requires some event or crisis that will lead to a disturbance of the 
status quo. For the disturbance of the status quo to become a controversy it requires two 
necessary conditions; a proposal is different from the status quo and a large enough group of 
supporters for it to become a serious challenge to the status quo. Closure occurs when the 
controversy becomes the new status quo by obtaining consensus of those involved. An audit 
technique only becomes accepted as a ‘good’ technique once closure has been obtained. 
Credibility, the final step, is the linking of the new status quo with some external knowledge or 
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practice. The credibility results in a new normal or status quo being reached for the practice or 
arrangement. Often this new status quo is obtained through connections with external forces 
such as regulatory systems or alignment with particular bodies of knowledge or communities 
that have currency at the time. This step is important as it makes the new arrangement appear 
“natural, obvious and temporarily at least, uncontested” (Power, 2003 p.392).  
One of the benefits of such a schema is that by using categories from outside the subject area of 
the study, namely audit, the researcher avoids using the terms of the subject area to evaluate the 
subject (p.390). Terms such as independence, professionalism and objectivity which are 
essential in audit are not used to evaluate proposals, as their meaning and relevance is 
intertwined with the acceptance of the proposals. The next section provides the background to 
the New Zealand local government at the times the three cases occurred, with the following 
section applying the explanatory schema to the three historical cases. 
4 New Zealand Local Government  
The three independent cases discussed below all relate to the auditing of New Zealand local 
government, with the first two cases focusing on municipalities. The first case to be discussed 
occurred in 1886, some 46 years after New Zealand became a British colony. By 1886 New 
Zealand was governed by its own Parliament based on the Westminster model. From 1876 
New Zealand had a two tier government structure; an all powerful central government and a 
subservient local government. Local bodies in New Zealand over the period covered had no 
general power of competency and were therefore restricted in what activities they undertook. 
They were limited to the items that they were either required or authorised to undertake by 
legislation, including their accounting and auditing practices.  
Local government in New Zealand has the responsibility for infrastructure services such as 
water and sewage services, local roads, and refuse collection and disposal, for social services, 
such as recreation facilities and libraries, and for the operation of a range of infrastructural 
trading activities for the local community. In contrast to a number of jurisdictions with which 
New Zealand is often compared; policing, health and education are not functions of territorial 
local government in New Zealand (Bush, 1995, ch.1). In additional there was a wide range of 
ad hoc boards that were included as part of local government such as harbour boards and pest 
boards. The vast majority of local government funds come from property rates and local 
charges, with only a small percentage coming from central government.  
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The key institution for these historical cases is the Controller and Auditor-General (CAG) and 
the department which that officeholder heads – the Audit Office. As a central government 
department of state the Audit Office has always been responsible for the audit of central 
government agencies. The Audit Office has a special relationship with central government; a 
relationship that ensures its independence is protected from interference by the government, to 
allow proper function of both its controller and its auditor roles. Its independence is 
safeguarded to a degree in legislation, where it indicates the Audit Office reports to the 
Parliament, not the government. How the Audit Office reported (or should report) on local 
government is covered in the following sections, as an integral part of the debates covering the 
mandate of the CAG in regard to local government. 
5 Auditor Office as Auditor of Municipalities. 
This section uses Power’s (2003) three categories of controversy, closure and credibility to 
illustrate how in two of the three cases the proposed changes to audit practices or arrangements 
needed to go through a number of steps to become legitimate practices/arrangements. It also 
helps illustrates why one of the proposals failed. 
5.1 1886 – Audit Office to be sole auditor of local government  
The arrangements for the auditing of local government in 1886 New Zealand are found in two 
separate pieces of legislation. The 1876 Municipal Corporations Act and previous Municipal 
Corporations statutes provided for the election of two auditors by the burgesses. Eligibility for 
election as auditor was open to anyone, except bankrupts, criminals, those of unsound mind, 
elected councillors and the mayor, and those who had close financial connections with a 
council (employees and business). The election of auditors was to be held annually, with 
remuneration for the elected auditors set annually by the council prior to their election (s.95). 
The 1878 Public Revenues Act provided for the Audit Office to perform an audit on any 
borough (and any other body) that received a grant from central government, if required by the 
Governor (s. 33). The Act also specified that this was the only situation where the Audit Office 
was to audit a borough, unless required by other legislation.  
This changed in 1886 when the Municipal Corporations Act 1886 made the Audit Office the 
auditor of all boroughs. Two concerns can be attributed to the appointment of the Audit Office 
as auditor of local government, with both concerns relating to perceived problems of 
independence if using an auditor that is part of the local community. The first relates to the 
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need to control and prosecute illegal expenditure by local authorities, and the second relates to 
the use of central government funds by local government.  
The genesis of the controversy or crisis can be traced back to 1881, when the CAG presented to 
Parliament a report titled “Report on the Audit of Public Revenues” (Controller and Auditor-
General, 1881). The report was the result of a study conducted by the CAG into practices in 
Australian colonies. That report began to generated concerns in New Zealand about the 
wisdom of having auditors elected from within the boroughs. The CAG considered that the 
existing system of electing auditors from local ratepayers relied on the “accident of finding 
individuals of sufficient public spirit and independent position to become prosecutors for the 
wrongs affecting all” (p.153). These ‘wrongs’, as mentioned above, related to illegal 
expenditure or inappropriate claiming of central government grants. Municipal councils could 
only spend money when they had legislative authority to do so, and they could only engage in 
activities that were permitted by legislation. Prior to the 1886 legislation it was expected that 
the auditor or ratepayers would identify illegal expenditure and lead to legal proceedings 
against the elected councillors to recover illegal spending. The CAG believed, and convinced 
the legislators, that the prospect of this system working was limited; thus he created a 
controversy, with both a challenge to the status quo and an assembly of allies for his new 
proposal. In relation to the second issue, the use of central government grants, the CAG in his 
1881 report illustrated his concern with reference to reported activities in one of the Australian 
colonies: 
Where subsidies of public money are granted to local bodies the necessity of an independent audit 
becomes of additional importance. As an example of this, a case was mentioned to me by the Secretary 
to the Treasury in one of the colonies, of a Road Board which was said to have for years obtained the 
subsidy from the Government payable in proportion to the rates raised, and to have subsequently repaid 
the ratepayers their rates, and so secured the subsidy without the required local taxation. (Controller 
and Auditor-General, 1881, p.153) 
Once again the status quo was challenged, in terms of the ability of existing arrangements of 
elected auditors to independently undertake their role. This was highlighted especially where 
an auditor might benefit financially as a result of his position as a local ratepayer and/or 
resident, should certain accounting/financial practices be undertaken. With the ease that the 
1886 Bill was passed through Parliament, we can assume that the CAG and his allies had 
successfully created the controversy and gained closure by the time the Bill was enacted. In 
this case there is no evidence of any residual desire to renegotiate the new normal – that the 
Audit Office is the auditor of municipal authorities. This is all the more surprising because 
local government could be fiercely parochial regarding interference of central government in 
its affairs.  
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All that was left for the CAG and his allies to do was to gain credibility for the new 
arrangement; credibility is seen by linking to the wider environment. The CAG achieved this 
by re-defining his role in relation to local government and their audits; 
It may be objected that any interference by a central authority with the proceedings of local 
institutions, violates the principle of local self-government, and removes from the people themselves 
that responsibility for the due care of their own interests which constitutes its chief value. But, on the 
other hand, it should be remembered that the powers vested in local bodies are not general or arbitrary, 
but are defined by law, and are granted for specific purposes. So long as the administration of the local 
authorities within the sphere of the duties imposed on them is left uncontrolled, it can hardly be said to 
be an interference with local government, if provision is made for restraining them from exceeding 
those duties. (Controller and Auditor-General, 1881, p.153) 
Credibility was thus gained by aligning the Audit Office’s role with concerns from those that 
were likely to be opponents, namely those who wanted to avoid central government 
involvement in local affairs. Using the controversy created by the CAG over the previous five 
years, since the release of his 1881 report, the CAG appealed to the ‘best interest’ of local 
government to justify his new powers. The controversy and the credibility share the same logic 
of avoiding wrong doing by local officials for the benefit of the local community. 
5.2 1891 and 1892 – The Failure to Pass Audit Legislation  
Within four years of the Audit Office being made the auditor of all local government bodies, 
the CAG sought in 1891 and again in 1892 additional powers and responsibilities in relation to 
local government. In 1891 the CAG had a Bill introduced into parliament that gave additional 
powers to the CAG in relation to local government financial management, especially around 
dealing with illegal transactions and associated penalties. A similar Bill was also introduced in 
1892. Both of these Bills failed to be passed. Much of the content of the Bills had been 
foreshadowed in the CAG’s 1881 Report to Parliament. That Report and both of these Bill ten 
years later had a strong emphasis on fraudulent and illegal activities and inappropriate 
accounting in local government. The report created the first part of a controversy, the 
disturbance of how people expect that local government politicians and officials may behave. 
The CAG raised the possibility that local government politicians and officials couldn’t be 
trusted and that the CAG should be given a stronger and enhanced mandate to take action 
against wayward councils and councillors. There were already provisions that dealt with these 
issues in the legislation, but the CAG wanted stronger enforcement and penalty provisions and 
for those powers to given to his office. 
The response of the local government community (via Parliament) to the proposed legislation 
was forceful and direct. The majority of speakers against the Bill were representatives of 
electorates in cities and large boroughs. The most forceful speech against the first Bill was by 
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Henry Fish, member for Dunedin City, who was acknowledged during the debate “as an 
authority on municipal matters”. In a style he was noted for (Sinclair, 1993), Fish led the attack 
on the Bill and the Controller and Auditor-General in the following words: 
This Bill appears to be a Bill of the most monstrous description ever presented to the House. I feel 
certain the Premier has never read the Bill; if he has read it he has not profited by the reading. It is not 
the Premier’s Bill; it is the Auditor-General’s Bill; he has drafted every line of it, and every line 
bristles with tyranny and autocracy of the most disgusting nature. Knowing that gentleman, however, 
as well as I do, I am not surprised that he has given us a Bill of this kind. I have no hesitation in saying, 
especially so far as Municipal Corporations are concerned, that the Bill is framed effectually for no 
other purpose than to hamper the finance, irritate the bookkeeping, and utterly demoralise the proper 
carrying-on of municipal functions. (NZPD, 1891 p.313) 
Fish criticised various parts of the Bill and the person of the CAG, objecting to both in very 
strong terms. He saw such legislation (and the likely interpretation of it by the current CAG) as 
constraining the activity of local authorities, and claimed that legislation should be used to 
“extend, and not to cramp, the powers of local bodies”. Other speakers were less damning of 
the Bill, but even those indicating support, did not give it without some qualification.  
The CAG’s concerns regarding the state of local body accounts, audit and financial 
management which had led him to prepare and submit the Bill to the government, were shared 
by many of the speakers: 
That there is reason for a more strict audit than we have had in the past none of us, I think, will deny; 
but I hold at the same time, that the present Bill is too sweeping. (NZPD, 1891 p.315) 
The 1891 Bill failed because the CAG had failed to gather sufficient allies around the 
disturbance. The following year a new Bill was introduced, which was considered by all to be 
less draconian. The 1892 Bill went through the parliamentary system with significant less 
agitation. It appears that there was the possibility of sufficient allies for the Bill to pass, but 
parts of the local government community were still against parts of the Bill. For example the 
Secretary of the Wellington Harbour Board suggested that the penalties were too severe and a 
disincentive to people to stand for election on boards and councils: 
Businessmen give their time and abilities gratuitously, to the service of the public, on local bodies, and 
so long as they act in good faith they ought not to be subjected to the possible infliction of fines or of 
surcharges or have the onus cast on them of moving the Supreme Court for remission thereof (LE 1 
1892/14). 
Thus whilst creating a controversy, the 1892 Bill lapsed because parts of the local government 
community were not prepared to renormalize practice along the lines of the Bill; in Power’s 
(2003) terms closure was not obtained. Both the allies and opponents of the second Bill were 
not willing to see the provisions in the Bill become part of the arrangements for local 
government finance. This was partly surprising given there was support for the actual 
provisions of the Bill.  
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It seems likely that the problem was the CAG himself, not the Bill. The CAG, James Edward 
FitzGerald, was not universally admired. A politician before late in life becoming CAG, he was 
much more at home in “the cut and thrust of public controversy” (Bohan, 1998 p.305) than the 
neutrality of his role as CAG. It is possible that a different man could have negotiated with 
both allies and opponents to gain closure and then credibility for his proposal to grant 
additional powers to the CAG in relation to local government financial. 
5.3 1980s – Operational Audits 
The third and final case of new audit arrangements being proposed for New Zealand local 
government relates to the introduction of operational audits. In 1973 the Minister of Local 
Government, Henry May, began the process of obtaining Cabinet approval for operational 
audits of local government. May attributed his inspiration for the idea from the then newly 
introduced efficiency inspections of local councils by the State Government of South Australia. 
At this point there was a clear disturbance of the status quo, namely the expansion of the role 
of audit beyond compliance audits, with two very important and powerful allies for the 
proposal; the CAG and the Minister of Local Government. Clearly the controversy had been 
established, yet obtaining closure and credibility were many years away. While operational 
audits were tentatively introduced in 1974, it took another ten years for them to gain legitimacy. 
During these ten years, the CAG needed to convince both allies and opponents of his views on 
the purpose of the audits and the criteria to be used in assessing performance during the audits, 
thus creating a new status quo.  
May and his central government colleagues’ intention for operational audits of local authorities 
was that they should be performed for the benefit of central government. The aim was to 
identify inefficiencies in local government, with the CAG reporting on these audits in the 
course of his normal reports to Parliament. A major concern for government at that time was 
the increased call by local authorities for additional funding from central government. The 
audits were regarded as a way of identifying inefficient authorities and providing justification 
for decisions not to agree to such authorities’ requests – if not as a way of rejecting all calls 
from local authorities justified by reference to a perception of inefficiency across the entire 
local government sector (AAWR w4351 7/2/4). This perception would be supported by the 
‘objective’ work of the Audit Office on operational audits. 
The Audit Office undertook the first audits with a very clear and different understanding of the 
audits from that of central government. The difference between the Minister’s objectives for 
the audits and the Audit Office’s was significant in three related areas. First, the Audit Office 
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viewed Cabinet approval for operational audits (AAWR w4351 7/2/4) as a request from the 
government to the Audit Office to undertake operational audits to which the Audit Office may 
or may not agree. It was not considered a directive from the government. Essentially, the Audit 
Office conceptualised its relationship with the government in such a manner that it retained 
power and initiative. Secondly, the Audit Office stated it would undertake the audits on its own 
initiative. Requests for operational audits from whomever, central governments, local 
government or citizens, would be evaluated by the Audit Office, but the decision to undertake 
the audit would be the Audit Office’s: 
These audits will be undertaken by the Office, or by persons reporting to it, on its own initiative and 
not on the directions or at the request of any Minister of the Crown or Department of State (AAWR 
w4351 7/2/4). 
And thirdly, reporting would be to executive officers of the council, perhaps to elected council 
members, and then, if sector wide issues were found, they could be reported in the CAG’s 
report to Parliament. The Audit Office policy, however, stated: 
It is not envisaged at this stage that reports will be made to any Minister or Department (AAWR 
w4351 7/2/4). 
In writing to the First Assistant Auditor-General in Canberra, the CAG wrote: 
As regards reporting, time will no doubt produce a difference of opinion between us and the Minister. I 
suspect the Minister would like our activities to be directed to some extent to the chopping off of 
heads. Our interest will be in attempting to establish whether the standards of performance in a local 
authority’s undertaking fall short of those which, from our pilot studies, we have found to be of an 
acceptable level. If such is the case, we would draw the attention of the local authority to those areas 
which we considered offered scope for improvements. Our attitude would also be one of problem-
finding, not problem-solving. The latter would be left to a local authority’s own officers or to 
consultants engaged by them. It would have to be a very extreme case of misadministration to justify 
our reporting to Parliament (AAWR w4351 7/2/4).  
The Audit Office warmly welcomed the enthusiasm of the Minister (Henry May) for the 
operational audits, because he was an important ally in the introduction of the audits. 
Significant and essential support was also received from the Minster of Finance and the 
Treasury, including funding of the audits (Controller and Auditor-General, 1972-79). Yet, in 
spite of this support from the Treasury and the Ministers, the Audit Office chose its own path 
and philosophy for the audits. By 1982 the debate on the purpose of the audits was settled, the 
Audit Office outlined what it considered to be the purpose of the audits: 
To assure the ratepayers that funds have been properly raised and properly spent. 
To assist local government in improving the standard of management of public funds (AAKS 7575 
w4991 36/19/2). 
While the ministers and the Treasury had a different idea as to the purpose of the audits, and 
the Audit Office succeed in having its view prevail, all three parties were central in ensuring 
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both aspects of a controversy was present; the disturbance of the status quo and the sufficient 
allies for that disturbance.  
With the controversy was being successfully created, the process of renormalizing practice or 
closure began in 1974. Subsequently more audits were undertaken, in a relatively quiet manner, 
drawing little attention to the audits other than in areas directly affected by them.  The final 
push to gain closure came in the early 1980s, when the Audit Office began to fully document 
how the audits would be undertaken. Obtaining agreement on the methodology of the audits 
was perhaps the most acrimonious moment in an otherwise reasonably harmonious relationship 
between local authorities and the Audit Office. The disagreement was principally between the 
smaller (in terms of both population and finances) councils and the Audit Office.  
The Audit Office sought to explain what and how the operational audits would audit through 
the preparation and publication of the Suggested Criteria for Good Management Practice in 
N.Z. Territorial Local Government (the Criteria) (Audit Office, 1981) in the early 1980s. The 
Criteria was an attempt to make transparent the rules for judgements that were to be made in 
operational audits. Following the release of the draft of the Criteria certain sections of local 
government took strong umbrage at parts of the document. The two key issues were: the 
application of the Criteria across all territorial local authorities, and questions concerning the 
Audit Office’s involvement in such audits and the activities of local government.  
The Criteria shared similarities with many of the Audit Office’s concerns regarding central 
government that were expressed three years earlier in the Shailes Report, (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 1978) particularly the focus on the setting and reporting of organisational 
objectives. The Criteria specified that sound management (within the existing legislative 
framework) should provide clear lines of accountability within an organisation, provide for a 
separation of responsibilities between elected councillors and employees of a council, and set 
and review performance measures. Accounting was regarded as a major part of this 
management process.  
The NZ Institute of County Engineers was critical of the Criteria on the basis that it 
recommended a single Chief Executive for each council. The practice in many county councils 
at the time was to operate a triumvirate system in which an elected county chairman worked 
with the county clerk and the county engineer; the latter two being of equal status. The 
Institute’s argument was that the system worked well in smaller councils and that a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach should not be applied to the entire territorial local government sector. 
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However, its motives may have been ‘closer to home’. In the penultimate sentence of the NZ 
Institute of County Engineers comment on the Criteria to the Audit Office, it wrote: 
The Institute considers the Engineers, because of their training, are well fitted in the NZ scene to 
occupy major managerial positions (AAWR w4357 7/2/4A).  
The rise of a local government managerial class to the relegation of the city/county engineer 
was occurring. Individual county/city engineers were concerned about their career promotion 
prospects and part of their professional association was also concerned for the status of that 
profession within local government. Public sector management reforms that began in New 
Zealand in the late 1980s, especially the application of managerialism, (Boston, et al. 1996 
chapter 4) were foreshadowed by the work of the Audit Office, including the Criteria.  
The second complaint was that central government, Wellington, or ‘Big Brother’, was 
becoming too involved in the affairs of local government. A senior local government official 
responded to the Criteria and was reported in his local press: 
Taranaki’s local bodies should beware of giving the Audit Department ‘another club to thump local 
government with,’ warned the Mayor of New Plymouth and president of the Municipal Association 
(Daily News, 1980). 
In response, the Deputy Auditor General presented the Audit Office’s view: 
Audit Office has two responsibilities: 
(a) To taxpayer for central government funds, 
(b) To ratepayers for local government funds. 
Note: The two should not be confused. When dealing with local government Audit Office is not a 
central agency, merely a Parliamentary appointed agency for auditing local government and reporting 
thereto to ratepayers. Only responsibility to parliament is to report that local government audits in the 
efficiency and effectiveness area have been done. All reporting is to council and to ratepayers. This is 
not a ‘big brother’ central government imposition, this is the ratepayers representative reporting to 
them (AAWR w4357 7/2/4A). 
By 1984 the Audit Office had weathered the storm over the Criteria, with the Audit Office 
stating that it “considers that the publication [the Criteria] … a success” (AAKS 7575 w4991 
7/2/4/A). It measured the success in terms of discussion generated as a result of suggestions in 
the Criteria. That local authorities adopted many suggestions in the Criteria was not 
considered by the Audit Office to be the key outcome of its publication; rather, the fact that 
local authorities discussed management practice (as defined by the Audit Office) was regarded 
as the more important result. This process saw the ideas in the Criteria become part of the 
administrative or perhaps management language and milieu for local government and thus 
creating credibility for the operational audits, albeit some ten years after the first audits were 
undertaken. 
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In two of the cases discussed, the proposals for additional powers for the CAG and Audit 
Office relating to local government were adopted and ultimately gained legitimacy. In the first 
case, granting the CAG the sole role of auditor of municipalities, legitimacy occurred with little 
conflict and almost immediately the bill was passed by the Parliament. This case has 
similarities to Coombs and Edwards (2004) study of the struggle for professional dominance in 
UK municipal auditing, albeit with a different form of analysis, as Coombs and Edwards 
(2004, p.82) seek to “understand why we do things, at present in a particular way”. In the 
second successful case, the introduction of operational audits, legitimacy was achieved only 
after significant debate on both the appropriateness of the Audit Office undertaking such work 
and on the Criteria that was to be used for the audits. As noted earlier there has been 
significant amount of research on various aspects of the operational audits; such as Funnell’s 
(1998) study at the institutional level and Guthrie and Parker (1999) analysis at the individual 
level, whereas this study has looked at process to gain legitimacy. The case to increase the 
power of the CAG that did not achieve legitimacy, despite two attempts, did so because none 
of the three stages, namely controversy, closure and credibility, were achieved.  
The use of Power’s (2003) schema has avoided an analysis that could be circular. Central to 
auditing practice and institutional arrangements are notions such as independence and 
objectivity. The use of the schema has meant that the analysis did not refer to these notions 
essential to the field itself. Both the second and third cases were subject to significant debate. 
In the second case the CAG wanted the additional powers so that there was someone 
independent to hold local government to account; whereas the local government community 
didn't want the additional powers given to the CAG because they perceived the CAG was not 
objective. In the third case, the CAG perceived the operational audits as an independent 
objective audit on behalf of local government community; whereas many in local government 
saw both the audits and the approach as interference and providing central government with 
“another club to thump” them. The use of the schema has prevented the research “from being 
slave to the concepts and categories of the audit field itself” (Power, 2003 p.390). 
Finally, this historical study has taken the generalised work of Power (2003) and evaluated it in 
three similar but distinct cases, illustrating both the usefulness of the schema for the specific 
and historical, and the utility of the specific and historical to evaluate the generalised 
(Fleischman, Mills and Tyson, 1996). The historical analysis has illustrated that the schema is 
useful, although the time patterns do not follow a strict form. The first case followed the 
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schema in reasonable logical manner. As the proposal was progressing it moved from one step 
to another. The controversy had been building for five years before the Bill was introduced to 
the parliament, and then moved reasonably quickly through the final two stages to gain 
legitimacy. Whereas the third case moved reasonably quickly through controversy, taking 
another 10 years to go through closure and credibility, with those two last stages being 
intertwined more so than either discussed by Power (2003) or seen in the first case. 
Furthermore the last two stages were not distinct but occurred in tandem, with the Audit Office 
seeking closure via quietly undertaking audits over a ten year period and credibility via the 
promotion and acceptance of the Criteria. The schema has been useful in organising parts of 
the three histories and at the same time allowing the specific in each case to be discussed and 
not overtaken by theory.  
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